Abstract -Reproductive interventions and technologies have the capacity to generate profound societal unease and to provoke hostile reactions underpinned by various moral concerns. This paper shows that this position currently goes relatively unchecked by the European Court of Human Rights, which allows the margin of appreciation and consensus doctrines significantly to limit the scope of reproductive rights under the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8. This occurs both in relation to the interest in avoiding reproduction at stake in abortion, and that in achieving it at stake in medically assisted reproduction. The paper demonstrates significant flaws in the Court's framing and deployment of these doctrines in its reproductive jurisprudence. It argues that, as regards existing and upcoming reproductive interventions and technologies, the Court should attend to the concept of reproductive health, long recognised in international conventions and policy materials.
INTRODUCTION
The right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has come to play an increasingly prominent role in the European Court of Human Rights' (ECtHR) reproductive jurisprudence, long overtaking the right to marry and found a family under Article 12.
1 As a right that can be limited, for instance for the 'protection of health or morals, or… the rights and freedoms of others', the critical question is typically whether State intervention in, or a failure to respect, the right is justified. In the reproductive context, the answer has been significantly affected by the discretion given to States, for example in relation to 'sensitive moral and ethical issues', 2 by means of the margin of appreciation doctrine 3 -frequently, 3 concomitant reduction in the margin, endorsing the weak and ill-considered concerns as to 'morals' (of the Austrian government).
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Thereafter the paper argues that the errors identified in the preceding section have been accompanied by the Court's failure to appreciate that the objectives of avoiding reproduction or of achieving medically assisted reproduction have been accepted in international conventions and policy materials as central dimensions of reproductive health, which entails interests that give rise to certain needs, and autonomy interests. While health interests giving rise to needs are recognised and protected to some degree in the abortion context, autonomy interests are not; conversely, while autonomy interests are at least recognised in relation to reproductive donation, treatment needs are not. If the Court is to move forward in this area, it should develop a greater understanding of reproductive interests as these relate to reproductive health, as the Council of Europe already has. 8 In turn, this would lead to more rigorous scrutiny of the alleged necessity of State intervention in applicants' Article 8 rights, or of failures to protect these, with closer attention to the distinction between the importance of the interest and the best means of protecting it, and less scope for the Court to defer to the margin doctrine.
As the final section highlights, with new reproductive technologies such as mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) on the point of entering clinical practice (for example in the United Kingdom (UK)) and scientific progress in relation to in-vitro-derived gametes, the Court will be increasingly challenged to develop its reproductive jurisprudence in more robust ways. If it continues to allow the consensus doctrine to broaden the margin of appreciation, it potentially allows relatively weak concerns as to 'morals' held by those who have no need for a given reproductive intervention -and thus no interest in choosing it -to bar serious consideration of its permissibility by the Court. In effect, this is to say that where the seriousness of the interest in using a new reproductive technology is contested, those with moral objections can preclude the Court from sufficiently stringent analysis of States' obligations under Article 8. This is a major flaw in the Court's framing of the margin and consensus doctrines. 
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THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND CONSENSUS DOCTRINES
The Court's well-known approach to analysis of a State's negative and/or positive obligations forms the backdrop to the margin of appreciation and consensus doctrines. It should be briefly set out here with particular reference to Article 8, which states in relevant part:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life… (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society… for the prevention of… crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Early on, the Court established that the object of Article 8 was the protection of individuals from arbitrary State interference. 9 The article's limitation clause is very similar to those limiting the other 'personal sphere' rights under Articles 9-11. 10 Regarding the notion of 'necessary in a democratic society', in the freedom of expression case of Handyside v United Kingdom (hereafter Handyside), in which the Court had to consider the justifiability of an interference under Article 10(2), the Court observed that this should not be understood as 'indispensable', nor just 'useful', 'desirable' or 'reasonable', and referred to the 'pressing social need implied by the notion of "necessity"'. 11 It also held that a restriction on a right must be 'proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' and that a State's given reasons to justify interference must be 'relevant and sufficient '. 12 Proportionality between the interests and rights of the individual and those of the community, including the public interest, thus underlies the assessment of necessity and the Convention as a whole, 13 and is relevant also to the Court's analysis of positive obligations. Regarding the distinction between these and negative obligations, the Court has acknowledged that the boundary is not precise, 14 and that the notion of 'respect' is particularly unclear for positive obligations. 15 In the reproductive context, the Court has also observed that 'certain factors' are relevant to a State's 9 Belgian Linguistics case (1968) 1 EHRR 241. See further Harris and others, n 3 above, 524-525. 10 Respectively, the rights to 'freedom of thought, conscience and religion', to 'freedom of expression' and to 'freedom of peaceful assembly and… of association with others'. For a general review of the relevant limitation clauses, see Harris above n 3, 505-520. 11 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 737 para 48. 12 Ibid paras 49 and 50 respectively. 13 In Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 89, the ECtHR observed: 'Inherent in the whole… Convention is a search for the fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's human rights.' 14 See eg Tysiąc v Poland (hereafter Tysiąc) (2007) 45 EHRR 42, para 111. 15 ' [H] aving regard to the diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion's requirements will vary considerably from case to case'. Ibid para 112. In X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235 (hereafter X and Y), para 23, the Court noted that these 'may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves'. On the lack of structure in the Court's analysis of these, see L. Both in relation to negative and positive obligations, the State has a certain margin of appreciation. In theory, this is a power given to States under the assumption that it will be exercised with attention both to the content of Convention rights and to the need to justify any interference, so the key question will be whether a State has exceeded its power, or its margin, in the proportionality assessment. 18 The margin doctrine positions the ECtHR, as an international By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as well as on the 'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' intended to meet them… [I]t is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of 'necessity' in this context.
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Although it later stressed that the margin is not 'unlimited', that it can give the 'final ruling' and that its supervision relates both to the aim and the necessity of the challenged measure, 23 many of 6 its cases belie this claim, 24 including in the reproductive cases discussed below, which frequently rely on the above passage.
The margin doctrine is highly controversial and, as Arai-Takahashi notes, has received 'more criticism than praise': 25 its operation is described as inconsistent, opaque, vague and indeterminate with a risk of the Court losing its supervisory role, with relativist or subjective results. 26 Judges, including from the Court, have expressed concern about the doctrine, both judicially and extra-judicially. 27 Benvenisti has described it as 'a principled recognition of moral relativism… at odds with the concept of the universality of human rights', and particularly inappropriate in conflicts between majorities and minorities. 28 In the reproductive sphere the margin doctrine is frequently deployed in relation to the aim of 'morals' under Article 8(2) yet, as 33 Handyside, para 48. 34 Harris and others, n 3 above, 10-11, argue that the acceptability of the margin and consensus doctrines may turn on the degree to which State practice accords with human rights standards. However, ultimately this could imply that they are acceptable where, in effect, they are irrelevant. Letsas, n 29 above, 124, argues that the States Parties undertook 'to respect human rights… [not] what, at each given time, most of them take those rights to be'. 35 Harris and others, n 3 above, 11 and citations therein. 36 Benvenisti, n 28 above, 852-3, argues that the doctrine is flawed theoretically (since it relies on 'nineteenth century theories of State consent', such that duties can only be imposed on States in the light of 'emerging custom, or "consensus"') and practically (since it is hard to imagine credible threats to the Court's authority, although the worry of such threats might result in abuse 47 Beyond these personal sphere rights, the Court has also deferred to States, on the basis of the margin doctrine, in relation to politically sensitive issues such as questions of public emergency 48 and, for example, regarding the right to property 49 or planning policy. 50 By contrast, the Court viewed the Sunday Times v United Kingdom case (which concerned a prohibition on a publication to prevent a 'contempt of court') as raising the 'far more objective notion of the "authority" of the judiciary', in relation to which 'domestic law and practice of the Contracting States reveal a fairly substantial measure of common ground… [which is] reflected in a number of provisions of the Convention, including
Article 6, which have no equivalent as far as "morals" are concerned'.
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The reproductive cases themselves typically exemplify the approach to the margin and consensus doctrines expressed in Evans v United Kingdom (hereafter Evans) (which concerned a dispute over the use of frozen embryos). 52 There the Court stated that although the margin will be limited where 'a particularly important facet of an individual's identity or existence is at stake', it will also be wider '[w]here… there is no consensus… either as to the relative importance of the interest… or as to the best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues'. 53 The specific application of these points is discussed at various stages of the analysis below, which identifies major problems in the application of the margin and consensus doctrines in the Court's reproductive jurisprudence.
REPRODUCTIVE MORALS AND MARGINS AT THE COURT
This section analyses the Court's use of the margin and consensus doctrines in some of its leading cases relating to avoiding reproduction and to achieving it.
Avoiding reproduction: abortion
The Court's abortion jurisprudence hinges on its currently flawed understanding of the relationship between Articles 8 and 2 as these apply to the pregnant woman and the fetus respectively. This section briefly takes these in turn, before considering the central issue -the relationship between them.
The pregnant woman and the fetus: articles 8 and 2
[P]regnancy cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the sphere of private life. Whenever a woman is pregnant, her private life becomes closely connected with the developing foetus. that the law must protect "everyone's right to life"'. 64 This wariness is understandable. Even where the balance between maternal and fetal interests is not directly at issue -as it is not where a third party is responsible for fetal harm -the question of the fetus's legal claims, if any, is complicated by its place inside the pregnant woman: case law findings as to the fetus's legal status have the potential to be used in cases that directly concern the maternal-fetal relationship. 65 While granting the fetus significant rights, including under Article 2, would not be problematic as regards the fetus's relationship to third parties who may harm it, to do so could conflict with the balance of maternal and fetal rights established in the context of abortion and in other instances of maternalfetal conflict. Given third-party representations made in Vo, this likely explains the Court's reluctance to say much about the fetus under Article 2, and to defer to the margin of appreciation. 66 It stated that 'there is no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life', and that the only point of agreement is that the embryo or fetus 'belongs to the human race'. 67 Here it referred to the context of embryo research. 68 However, the justification for doing so is unclear: an embryo is less developed than any fetus; furthermore, outside the woman's uterus, issues of maternal-fetal conflict are much less likely to arise. 69 More recently, in Parrillo v Italy, the Court has also stated that a wider margin will apply in the context of embryo research than in that of reproduction, on the basis that donation of embryos to research is not a 'core right' under Article 8 as it does not concern a 'particularly important aspect of the individual's existence and identity.' 70 Thus, approaches to embryo research are not necessarily relevant or determinative in related but distinct contexts. Referring also to a range of ongoing developments in France itself, including regarding embryo research and third-party liability for fetal harm, the Vo Court concluded that it was 'neither desirable, nor even possible' to decide the issue before it in 'abstract' terms; 71 therefore, even if Article 2 were applicable, in this case it had not been violated. 84 In turn, given the fetus's location inside the pregnant woman, any legal position on abortion must necessarily attend both to the pregnant woman and to the fetus. This means that there is no 'abstract, logically prior' question of the fetus's legal status. Let us make clear… that… [t]he issue… was whether, regardless of when life beginsbefore birth or not -the right to life of the foetus can be balanced against the right to life of the mother, or her right to personal autonomy and development, and possibly found to weigh less than the latter rights or interests. And the answer seems to be clear: there is an undeniably strong consensus among European States… to the effect that, regardless of the answer to be given to the scientific, religious or philosophical question of the beginning of life, the right to life of the mother, and, in most countries' legislation, her well-being and health, are considered more valuable than the right to life of the foetus… Consequently, we believe that the majority erred when it inappropriately conflated… the question of the beginning of life (and as a consequence the right to life), and the States' margin of appreciation in this regard, with the margin of appreciation that States have in weighing the right to life of the foetus against the right to life of the mother or her right to health and well-being.
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The meaning of the last section is not entirely clear. However, the joint (part) dissent apparently recognised that the consensus that does exist regarding a pregnant woman's interests and rights 87 On the 'implicit' positions on the legal status of the fetus in states' abortion laws, see also Fenwick, n 76 above, 221. 88 As Arai-Takahashi, n 4 above, 100, notes, referring to the Court's consideration of 'cultural justifications'. The approach is described as 'exceptionally relativistic' by Fenwick, n 76 above, 215. Wicks, n 55 above, describes it as a 'startling departure from its previous practice', 561, that is 'unwelcome', 562. to the margin. 92 The special weight that, drawing on Handyside, the majority gives to the government's statement of these views is troubling: it wrongly implies that, by describing these as 'profound', they amount to some 'free-standing entity' which can be 'sealed off' from the moral interests at stake in a woman's Article 8 rights. Since a fetus develops inside a pregnant woman, this is not the case. 93 In 
Medically assisted reproduction: reproductive donation
Together with the European consensus, the margin of appreciation is… the other pillar of the Grand Chamber's reasoning… Ultimately, through the combined effect of the European consensus and the margin of appreciation, the Court has chosen a minimum -or even minimalist -approach that is hardly likely to enlighten the national courts.
95
While this could have referred to the majority in A, B & C, it was written the following year, in
S.H. v Austria (hereafter S.H.)
, by the stingingly critical Grand Chamber joint dissent. The case, in which the Court accepted that the right to private and family life was invoked, 96 concerned the interest in reproducing and the medical assistance that may be needed to achieve this, with particular reference to donated gametes.
Two couples made claims. To have a child to whom one parent would be genetically related, the first needed IVF and sperm donation, the second IVF and ovum, or egg, donation.
97 92 Ibid para 9. 93 This leaves to one side the remote possibility of ectogenesis. 94 See above text preceding n 79, and n 79 itself. 95 S.H., Joint Dissenting Opinion, para 11. 96 S.H., para 82. 97 Ibid, paras 10-12.
However, both couples were confronted with prohibitions against the use of donated gametes in Austrian law: against sperm donation when IVF was also needed, and against ovum donation (which can only occur with IVF). 98 The couples lodged a joint but unsuccessful case with the Austrian Constitutional Court in 1998; in 2000, they filed a case with the ECtHR, leading to a 2010 Chamber judgment that found a breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, as regards all the applicants, and found it unnecessary separately to consider the application of Article 8; 99 however, the Grand Chamber ultimately ruled against them in 2011. The protracted timeframe of the case is relevant to the Court's approach to one of the 'twin pillars' -the use the Court made of the consensus doctrine.
The applicants argued that 'the special importance of the right to found a family and the right to procreation' meant that Contracting States had no margin in their regulation of these matters. 100 However, while the Court accepted that the margin will be reduced when 'a particularly important facet of an individual's existence or identity' is invoked, 101 citing Evans and its flawed decision in A, B & C, it rapidly deployed the notion of consensus to widen the margin again and, as will be seen below, simply avoided proper consideration of the importance of the interests at stake. 102 
The margin of appreciation and consensus: time, numbers, and the pace of medical developments
The Court's assessment of consensus hinged on time and numbers in relation to the pace of medical developments. returns to Austria, to some extent it thereby undermined its own acceptance of the Austrian Government's position that a split between the genetic and gestational mother in this context is problematic. 135 In sum, by downplaying the legal consensus among Contracting States and endorsing the Austrian Government's weak moral and legal arguments, the Court never assessed the proportionality of the alleged necessity of the interference in the applicants' rights. 136 Furthermore, lacking from its judgment was any discussion, let alone recognition, of the seriousness of the applicants' needs, which were insufficiently addressed by the gesture that they could go abroad. [a] neutral and pragmatic harm reduction approach refuses to engage with abortion as a normative matter.' 135 I say 'to some extent' because there is a distinction between 'sorting out' legal issues that are the result of practices which a country prohibits, and directly permitting those practices. 136 Cf the careful review regarding competing private and public interests and the concept of proportionality in Dickson, esp para 82. 137 The Court only advised the Austrian government to keep the area under review, S.H. para 118, citing Rees, in which the Court warned the UK government to review the area of gender change and the right to marry, and Goodwin as illustrative of cases in which the Court moved over time from findings of no breach to breach. Scherpe, n 105 above, notes that this is a warning that the margin is 'shrinking', 279.
failure to understand and protect important dimensions of reproductive health, considered in the next section.
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS: INTERESTS, AUTONOMY AND NEEDS
If the Court's approach in S.H. is a prime example of a failure to take interests in medically assisted reproduction seriously, a parallel failure to take the interest in avoiding reproduction sufficiently seriously is present in its abortion jurisprudence, as evidenced in the majority approach in A, B &
C. The argument below shows that, while the Court has recognised, but not necessarily protected, autonomy in the assisted reproduction context, it has not appreciated the health interests at stake.
By contrast, while its abortion jurisprudence has recognised, but not necessarily protected, women's health interests, it has paid little more than lip service to women's autonomy. 138 In this (arguably overbroad) definition of health 'as a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity' is well-known. 142 Situated within this and thus more narrowly construed is its depiction of reproductive health as 'address[ing]… the reproductive processes, functions and system at all stages of life'. 143 As far back as 1988, the WHO stated that reproductive health means (in part) 'that people… have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so'. 144 This understanding was 'adopted and expanded' in UN conferences, 145 leading to wide recognition of the importance of protecting rights relating to reproductive and sexual health in various international conventions. 146 In the light of the international recognition of the concept of reproductive health, to which the ECtHR is entitled to attend, 147 
Medically assisted reproduction
Ultimately, what is at stake here is not a question of choice between different techniques but, more fundamentally, a restriction on access to heterologous in vitro fertilisation constituting denial of access to available treatment.
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As the joint dissent in the S.H. Grand Chamber understood, this was the core issue in the case.
This critical observation followed its reference to the WHO's long-standing work on infertility.
The 157 In this way, it significantly downplayed the importance of the interest in being able to achieve the birth of a child (where this is sought). Judge de Gaetano's Separate Opinion, which referred to the '"desire" for a child', 158 suggesting that this could not be allowed to become an 'absolute goal' even more strongly (characteristically) ignores the idea of infertility as a negative condition that has serious health impacts and merits treatment. treatment, to have a child, given that the ability to make this choice is a central feature of a good life. 160 So, missing from the majority's reasoning is the recognition of infertility as a highly negative impediment to reproductive health, and thus a recognition of infertility as potentially giving rise to treatment needs, about which choices should be available.
Regarding the second point, while the idea of 'selection' may generate concerns about 'eugenics', a controversial and well-discussed topic, 161 most Contracting States permit selection to avoid serious disease, for instance in the form of prenatal and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PND and PGD). 162 In the case of donated gametes (where avoiding disease in the future child is not typically an issue for the couple seeking such assistance) the most likely reason for selection is to achieve some likeness, if possible, to the physical features of the couple seeking treatment, perhaps principally for privacy reasons (at least as regards non-family members) as to the manner of conception. 163 Seen in this way, a degree of selection should be viewed sympathetically with reference to the underlying need. While it may be possible to select in other ways, 164 in the absence of a significant degree of choice between gametes, options will be highly limited. If ever supply were abundant, unlikely to be the case with respect to ovum donation in a system of unpaid donation, 165 selection options would increase. However, as the S.H. Chamber majority noted, regulation is the primary answer to any concerns about the possible scope of selection. 166 Thus, the Grand Chamber majority wrongly ignored a less restrictive alternative as part of its failure properly to address the question of proportionality. 167 The ability to choose not to have a child is also central to reproductive health, as the WHO has recognised: 'Implicit in [reproductive health]… are the right of men and women to be informed of and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of fertility regulation of their choice'. 168 The discussion now considers the concept of reproductive health with reference to the inadequacies of the ECtHR's abortion jurisprudence. which concerned a serious threat to a woman's eyesight from continued pregnancy, which was also highly distressing to her. 173 Although the Court in Tysiąc acknowledged this distress, it has not advanced its understanding of psychological integrity in the abortion context. 174 While various philosophical accounts of psychological integrity have been developed, 175 given the Court's past interpretations it is doubtful that any is helpful here. 176 In the abortion context, while physical integrity most obviously concerns potentially negative impacts of pregnancy and its aftermath on physical health, arguably psychological integrity relates to the impact of pregnancy and (if this is continued) childbirth and child-raising on a woman's mental health. 177 Furthermore, given the mental (and physical) demands of each and all of these aspects, at issue in psychological integrity will be the ability to choose whether or not to continue a pregnancy; indeed, the negative psychological sequelae of a lack of choice in relation to abortion are well documented. 178 Thus, the ideas of autonomy and psychological integrity are intimately connected in the abortion context. The Court's neglect of this aspect of psychological integrity is itself consistent with its failure to develop, let alone protect, autonomy in this context, despite its bland references to it. 179 Recognition of both interests is required since sole reliance on psychological integrity may result in continued emphasis only on the passive dimensions of health, that is, on mental and physical health as affected by a condition, such as pregnancy. So, only a need to terminate would at least potentially be recognised, with ongoing neglect of the significance of the interest in being able actively to make choices about a matter affecting one's mental (and physical) health and future life course. Currently, the Court's protections of the interest in termination, to the extent that these exist, are dominated by paternalistic concerns which do not accord autonomy, including moral autonomy, to the pregnant woman. 180 While, as Zampas and
Avoiding reproduction
Gher have argued, the Court's recognition of the health interests at stake in the abortion context is to be welcomed, as Erdman maintains, the 'harm reduction' approach -in which health is helpfully appreciated as an 'objective good' -needs to be complemented with legal recognition of the autonomy interests at stake. 181 Finally, I consider the implications of the above analysis for the Court's treatment of new and emerging reproductive technologies.
THE PROSPECTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
An attractive feature of the WHO's account of reproductive issues is its understanding of these in relation to the concept of reproductive health. The account is appealing, and powerful, for what may seem, at face value, its moral neutrality. 182 Yet the concepts of need and autonomy implicit in its account are important moral ones. As we have seen, these concepts can also be situated in relation to an interest-based account of human rights and are thus highly relevant to the development of the ECtHR's reproduction jurisprudence.
Since these are moral concepts, the seriousness of the need is morally contested in both the abortion and medically assisted reproduction contexts, as is the appropriate scope of autonomy.
However, the analysis so far has shown that the existing legal consensus among Closest to entering clinical practice in any Contracting State, notably the United Kingdom -which has built here on its strong legal framework for medically assisted reproduction -are mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) to avoid maternally inherited mitochondrial disease. 184 The United Kingdom has already permitted the use of PGD to avoid serious genetic conditions for many years (in addition to PND and selective termination). 185 MRTs are different:
they involve changing the genetic composition of an ovum or embryo, substituting 'healthy' for 'unhealthy' mitochondria (with the aid of a donated ovum). 186 When the UK Government commissioned the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) to establish the public's views regarding the introduction of such techniques, the public was more in favour than against. 187 Despite this, there was opposition to their legalisation. 188 A prominent objection was that women (and couples) have 'alternatives': they could adopt, or seek 'standard' IVF treatment with a donated ovum. 189 We might call this the 'Existence of Alternatives' argument.
This argument acts as a counterweight to the idea of need and challenges the appropriate scope of the relevant autonomy. When invoked, it results in a concomitant downgrading of the interest which generates the need -in the case of MRTs, the interest in having not only a child free from serious genetic disease but also to whom the woman, the future mother, is genetically related (through the nuclear genome), where this connection is sought. We can see this argument already being used by the Court in the cases discussed here: from both A, B & C and S.H. the ideas, respectively, that women needing abortions for health and wellbeing reasons, or couples needing donated gametes with IVF, have the 'alternative' of going abroad. In each case, this legal use of the argument turned in part on a failure to recognise a relevant consensus; it was also parasitic on the far more permissive position in the majority of Contracting States. The unacceptability of the 'going abroad' alternative has been criticised here and by others. 190 We can also see very clearly in these cases that, given that unacceptability, the autonomy of the applicants (including to seek to address their needs in their own countries) was severely constrained. 191 In challenging the idea of need and the appropriate scope of autonomy, the Existence of Alternatives argument contests the strength of the relevant reproductive interests.
In turn, this raises important questions regarding who can and should judge this issue, encompassing as it does a judgment as to whether there is a need for a given reproductive technology, coupled with the acceptability, or otherwise, of the 'alternatives' between which a woman or couple can 'choose'. As we have seen, according to the ECtHR, prima facie the more important the interest is, the greater the degree of protection it should receive and the narrower the margin of appreciation should be; crucially, however, lack of consensus can negate this. 192 In effect, and significantly, where the strength of the interest is contested the consensus doctrine can prevent the Court from direct consideration of the critical question of that strength. Since, for instance, infertility issues or the risk of serious genetic disease in offspring affect a minority, 193 and given the likely influence of hostile preferences in relation to the lawfulness of reproductive interventions and technologies, this is highly problematic.
As regards upcoming reproductive technologies that are not yet legal, policy debates have now begun regarding, for instance, the moral and legal permissibility of nuclear genome editing technologies such as CRISPR/Cas-9 to avoid serious genetic conditions in offspring. 194 In-vitro derived gametes to relieve infertility and maintain genetic connection between parents and children (where this be sought) are also the subject of research, including potentially in relation to samesex couples, and may soon enter the policy arena. 195 In these and other cases questions will arise about the degree of need and the appropriate scope of autonomy as regards the technologies. 196 Ultimately, it is likely that the ECtHR will have to address these questions, at which point many of the insufficiently addressed issues at stake in S.H. in particular will resurface. If the Court's answer to potential future challenges as to the legal impermissibility of the use of these technologies in various Contracting States will be to rely heavily on the idea of a lack of consensus, it is likely to be a long time before it seriously considers the strength of the reproductive interests at stake in their use. 197 Where it finds a lack of consensus, this may only tell us that many States have not considered the issue in question; alternatively, if a prohibitive consensus is found, it may only tell us that, mindful of their margins under the sometimes lax eye of the ECtHR, States have allowed concerns as to 'morals' to support prohibition. 198 It is also conceivable that, over time, a prohibitive consensus will be the result of considered reflection in which various States decide, for instance, that nuclear genome editing is too problematic to permit although, perhaps not surprisingly, a recent UK survey of people affected by relevant genetic conditions showed 'overwhelming' support for their development for therapeutic purposes. doctrines. Should this continue, it will likely result in the entrenchment of insufficiently considered restrictive approaches to reproductive issues that fail properly to address the strength of the interests at stake and, as appropriate, to respect and protect reproductive rights, with considerable detriment to women's, and sometime men's, reproductive health.
